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A long-standing position in philosophy, law, and theology is that a person can be held
morally responsible for an action only if they had the freedom to choose and to act
otherwise. Thus, many philosophers consider freedom to be a necessary condition for
moral responsibility. However, empirical findings suggest that this assumption might not
be in line with common sense thinking. For example, in a recent study we used surveys
to show that – counter to positions held by many philosophers – lay people consider
actions to be free when they are spontaneous rather than being based on reasons. In
contrast, responsibility is often considered to require that someone has thought about
the alternative options. In this study we used an online survey to directly test the degree
to which lay judgements of freedom and responsibility match. Specifically, we tested
whether manipulations of deliberation affect freedom and responsibility judgements in
the same way. Furthermore, we also tested the dependency of these judgements on a
person’s belief that their decision had consequences for their personal life. We found
that deliberation had an opposite effect on freedom and responsibility judgements.
People were considered more free when they acted spontaneously, whereas they were
considered more responsible when they deliberated about their actions. These results
seem to suggest that deliberating about reasons is crucially important for the lay concept
of responsibility, while for the lay notion of freedom it is perceived to be detrimental.
One way of interpreting our findings for the interdisciplinary debate on free will and
responsibility could be to suggest that lay beliefs match the philosophical position of
semi-compatibilism. Semi-compatibilists insist that the metaphysical debate on the
nature of free will can be separated from the debate on conditions of responsible
agency. According to our findings the beliefs of lay people are in line with views
held by semi-compatibilists, even though we did not test whether they endorse that
position explicitly.
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INTRODUCTION
Philosophers have been analyzing the relation of free will and
responsibility since antiquity. Most of them have proposed that
freedom is a necessary condition for responsibility (Van Inwagen,
1983; Kant, 1998; Aristotle, 2000; Augustine, 2006; Vihvelin,
2008). Many philosophers furthermore claim that people act
freely or autonomously only if they act for reasons (Locke, 1975;
Kant, 1998), or only if they are provided with options with
different values (Van Inwagen, 1989; Kane, 2005; Schlosser, 2014;
Mecacci and Haselager, 2015), or only if the action has significant
consequences for their personal life (Roskies, 2011; Schlosser,
2014; Mecacci and Haselager, 2015).
Recent empirical research has shown that lay people’s beliefs
do not agree with these conceptual positions. In one study
(Deutschländer et al., 2017) we found that the deliberation
of reasons, the availability of different choice options, or the
existence of real life consequences were all not necessary for
an action to be considered free. On the contrary, lay people
judged actions to be most free if (a) they were chosen without
deliberation, (b) they involved different (as opposed to equal)
options, and (c) they were believed to have different real-
life consequences. Thus, paradoxically, deliberation was even
considered to reduce freedom, counter to the notion that reasons
play a key role in assigning freedom to actions.
Please note that this research pertained to subjective ratings
of freedom rather than responsibility. For lay concepts of
responsibility, in contrast, deliberation might non-etheless be
important, but this hasn’t been empirically tested so far.
Previous studies have already jointly measured the effects of
experimental conditions on free will and moral responsibility
judgements (Nahmias et al., 2005, 2007), however, regarding
somewhat different experimental manipulations than here (see
section “Discussion”).
Thus, here, we directly compare how freedom judgements
and responsibility judgements of laypeople are affected by the
factors deliberation, choice, and consequence. We compare
how the following factors affect judgements of freedom versus
responsibility: (1) Whether an action was spontaneous or based
on deliberation; (2) whether the decision involved qualitatively
different options (choosing) or identical options (picking) [for
the distinction between picking and choosing see Ullmann-
Margalit and Morgenbesser (1977)]; (3) whether the subsequent
actions led to consequences for a person’s life or not. As Nahmias
et al. (2005) note, it is very difficult to ask subjects about abstract
theories like determinism and compatibilism that are quite far
removed from everyday life without biasing their answer in
crafting the vignettes. Instead, we have opted to test action types
that are both clearly relevant for the free will discussion, but also
easily understandable in an everyday context.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We deployed an online-questionnaire via university email
distribution-lists. We received responses of 133 participants
(62.6% female, 31.3% male, 3.8% missing values). The age of the
respondents ranged from 18 to 53 years (Mage = 25.03 years,
SDage = 7.76 years). Almost all respondents (97.7%) had a
high-school or university degree. 66.7% of the respondents
had not previously thought about the question of free will,
while the remaining third had (“Have you ever thought
about free action or free will?”). The research was approved
by the psychological ethics committee of the Humboldt
University in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki.
Informed consent was obtained at the beginning of the
online-questionnaire.
Material and Procedure
We asked participants to respond to questions in an online
questionnaire containing short written scenarios. We
implemented those scenarios in the software Unipark (Questback
GmbH, Köln, Germany). Each questionnaire contained eight
scenarios. Those scenarios followed from a combination of three
within-subject factors: deliberation, choice, and consequence.
The factor deliberation used two levels: A person either
deliberated about their choice or acted spontaneously. The
factor choice included two levels: “choosing” among different
options or “picking” among identical options. The factor
consequence had two levels: Participants knew that the action
either had significant consequences for a person’s life (signing
a job contract) or it involved an insignificant action with no
consequences (taking a note) (see Table 1 for all scenarios
used in this study based on all possible combinations of the
three factors). Before starting the questionnaire participants
were randomly assigned to one of two possible groups: One
group was asked to provide only freedom ratings, the other
group was required to provide only responsibility ratings. This
between-subjects approach in our mixed design was adopted
in order to avoid priming the participants to the purpose of
the study.
At the beginning, subjects were presented with instructions
for completing the questionnaire. We asked the respondents
to assess how free/responsible they considered each of
eight displayed actions according to their individual
beliefs. For each respondent, the order of the scenarios
was randomized. The respondent saw only one scenario
at a time. Subjects answered using a rating scale with
a range from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates “not free/not
responsible” and 100 “free/responsible” (depending on the
group, they had been assigned to). Please note that in the
philosophical literature, freedom and responsibility are
frequently considered dichotomous rather than continuous.
Here we opt for the continuous scale because it entails
the dichotomous case as one possibility for participants
to respond. Below the freedom/responsibility rating an
additional question was presented that asked, “How
confident are you about the rating?” (confidence rating,
CR) and was to be answered on a scale from 0 “not
certain” to 100 “certain.” This was done to monitor
whether subjects had clear beliefs about the different
scenarios. There were no time constraints for responding
to the questions.
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TABLE 1 | The three within-subject factors and the corresponding scenarios.
Within-subject factors Operationalization
Deliberation Choice Consequence Scenario
Deliberation Choosing Yes Matthias looks for a new long-term job. He has gotten two job offers. For both jobs he received contracts for
signing. The job conditions are very different. Matthias deliberates what job would be better. Only after careful
pondering he decides for a job and signs one contract.
Deliberation Choosing No Matthias looks for a pen to take a rather unimportant note. On the desk in front of him he sees two very different
pens. Matthias deliberates what pen to choose. Only after careful pondering he decides and takes one pen.
Deliberation Picking Yes Matthias looks for a new long-term job. He has gotten two job offers. For both jobs he received contracts for
signing. The job conditions are identical. Nevertheless Matthias deliberates what job would be better. Only after
careful pondering he decides for a job and signs one contract.
Deliberation Picking No Matthias looks for a pen to take a rather unimportant note. On the desk in front of him he sees two identical pens.
Matthias deliberates what pen to choose. Only after careful pondering he decides and takes one pen.
Spontaneity Choosing Yes Matthias looks for a new long-term job. He has gotten two job offers. For both jobs he received contracts for
signing. The job conditions are very different. Matthias does not deliberate what job to choose. He signs one
contract spontaneously.
Spontaneity Choosing No Matthias looks for a pen to take a rather unimportant note. On the desk in front of him he sees two very different
pens. Matthias does not deliberate what pen to choose. He takes one pen spontaneously.
Spontaneity Picking Yes Matthias looks for a new long-term job. He has gotten two job offers. For both jobs he received contracts for
signing. The job conditions are identical. Matthias does not deliberate what job to choose. He signs one contract
spontaneously.
Spontaneity Picking No Matthias looks for a pen to take a rather unimportant note. On the desk in front of him he sees two identical pens.
Matthias does not deliberate what pen to choose. He takes one pen spontaneously.
RESULTS
Ratings of Freedom and Responsibility
Figure 1 shows the mean judgements of freedom and
responsibility plotted separately for the three main experimental
factors (for full results see Table 2). We performed a four-factorial
mixed ANOVA with three within-subject experimental factors
(Deliberation × Choice × Consequences) and one between-
subject factor (Rating Type).
(1) Overall, participants rated the responsibility for actions
higher than their freedom, as indicated by a significant
main effect of the between-subject factor Rating Type
[Figure 1; F(1,131) = 15.37, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.40].
(2) There was a significant interaction effect between the
factors Deliberation and Rating Type [Figure 1A;
F(1,131) = 35.66, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.12]. This strong
effect indicates that the factor Deliberation had different
effects on ratings of freedom. Deliberating about an
action (as opposed to acting spontaneously) led subjects
to judge that action as more responsible but less free.
The difference between freedom ratings of deliberate
versus spontaneous actions was significant t(266) =−2.92,
p = 0.004, Cohen’s d = 0.26. The difference between
responsibility ratings of deliberate versus spontaneous
actions was also significant t(288) = 9.07, p < 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 0.56.
(3) There was no significant interaction effect of Rating
Type and Choice [Figure 1B; F (1,131) = 0.257,
p = 0.663], indicating that the judgment of freedom versus
responsibility was not differentially affected by whether a
choice involved different or equal options.
(4) There was a significant interaction between Rating
Type and Consequences [Figure 1C; F(1,131) = 5.55,
p = 0.020, Cohen’s d = 0.21]. While an action with
consequences for a person’s life (compared to an action
without consequence) was judged to make a person more
responsible t(288) = 3.52, p > 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.23 it
had no effect on the degree to which the action was rated
as free t(266) = −0.21, p = 0.83.
Ratings of Confidence
Throughout the conditions, confidence ratings were high
(M = 78.50; SD = 24.44), ranging from 67.73 to 86.86 (Table 2).
Thus, we found no evidence that participants were uncertain how
to judge the scenarios.
DISCUSSION
Our results reveal important dissociations between judgements of
freedom and responsibility regarding actions. Overall ratings of
responsibility were higher than those of freedom. However, given
the between-participant design of the study this overall difference
might be a matter of scaling and is thus hard to interpret. The key
finding is that the experimental variables affect these two types of
ratings differentially: When an action was based on deliberation
(rather than being spontaneous), the action was judged to be
less free, but its agent was considered to be more responsible for
it. When an action involved real-world consequences (vs. not),
its agent was considered more responsible, but consequences
did not affect the freedom. Whether an action was between
equal options or not had no discernible effect on freedom or
responsibility ratings.
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics.
Design factors Rating Confidence
rating (CR)
Deliberation Choice Consequence Rating type M SD M SD
Deliberation Choosing Yes Freedom 67.07 28.21 75.69 23.81
Deliberation Choosing No Freedom 56.68 32.21 77.81 22.01
Deliberation Picking Yes Freedom 65.12 32.56 71.61 28.98
Deliberation Picking No Freedom 68.19 29.39 74.49 26.20
Spontaneity Choosing Yes Freedom 73.64 28.65 77.53 26.44
Spontaneity Choosing No Freedom 76.76 30.83 67.73 29.99
Spontaneity Picking Yes Freedom 66.47 34.51 78.59 26.78
Spontaneity Picking No Freedom 71.83 27.09 71.24 25.69
Deliberation Choosing Yes Responsibility 86.05 19.51 84.89 19.65
Deliberation Choosing No Responsibility 83.34 25.83 86.86 20.91
Deliberation Picking Yes Responsibility 90.82 16.51 83.80 23.15
Deliberation Picking No Responsibility 91.85 13.14 85.09 21.83
Spontaneity Choosing Yes Responsibility 68.06 28.51 77.35 24.75
Spontaneity Choosing No Responsibility 70.22 29.99 81.39 25.25
Spontaneity Picking Yes Responsibility 73.75 32.14 81.56 24.67
Spontaneity Picking No Responsibility 76.99 25.25 80.26 20.92
FIGURE 1 | Interaction between rating type separately for each the three within-Subject factors (Collapsed across all other conditions): (A) interaction between rating
type and deliberation, (B) interaction between rating type and choice, and (C) interaction between rating type and consequence error bars indicate SEM across all
subjects of one group. Asterisks indicates significant difference for post hoc analysis (n.s.– p > 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001).
Our study did not explicitly seek a representative sample
(similar to many previous studies, e.g., those using Mechanical
Turk). It consisted of a spontaneous sample of respondents
responding to an invitation to participate. Overall, the
distribution of ages in our sample is not that different than
in standard experiments in psychology (mean age 25.03 years,
standard deviation 7.76 years; please note that sampling from a
Gaussian will always involve a few values from the tails). Our
study was thus not designed to resolve the effects of age ranges. In
order to address this important point we are currently obtaining
data from representative samples on related scenarios, which is
the only way to properly address these effects.
Previous studies have used similar designs to assess
influences of experimental factors on free will and moral
responsibility judgements (Nahmias et al., 2005, 2007). In
one study (Nahmias et al., 2005) switching from a negative
action (robbing a bank) to a positive action (saving a
child) increased moral responsibility ratings but decreased
freedom ratings. However, this specific aspect of the study
can only be observed descriptively because no direct test
for an interaction between these two factors was provided
(the focus of the study was otherwise). Another study
(Nahmias et al., 2007) showed for different manipulations
(switching between neural and psychological determinism,
switching between the real world and an alternate world,
and switching between good and bad actions) that free
will and moral responsibility were generally affected in a
similar direction. In contrast, we find that factors such as
deliberation and the presence or absence of consequences do
have differential effects on free will and responsibility. Based
on our previous work (Deutschländer et al., 2017) one could
speculate that these experimental manipulations might have
been stronger in bringing out the dissociations between free will
and responsibility.
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In the present data, the freedom ratings considered alone
were only affected by deliberation, but not by the nature of the
choice (choosing/picking) or by the possible consequences. This
is largely in line with a previous study where we found the factor
of deliberation to have a moderate effect (Deutschländer et al.,
2017), whereas the factors of choice and consequences had only
marginal effects. Presumably the minor differences are due to the
lower number of participants in the current study.
One question is whether participants could have understood
the deliberation vignettes differently. For example, if an agent
acted spontaneously, participants might have thought that the
agent had reasons but was not aware of them. In that case
the difference between acting spontaneously versus deliberately
was that the agent was aware of their reasons if they acted
deliberately while they were not aware of their reasons if they
acted spontaneously. In order to investigate this alternative
interpretation, future research should distinguish between having
reasons, being aware of those reasons, and forming reasons
by deliberation. Furthermore, future studies could provide a
more in-depth assessment between judgements of free will and
responsibility by directly probing individual participants on both
concepts within a single study.
Another interesting question is whether the freedom or
responsibility effects pertain to the agent’s action or to the
situation. In our first main finding the experimental manipulation
is independent of the situational context: The difference between
deliberative and spontaneous is only in the internal mental
process, while the external conditions remain exactly the same.
Here, the key effect of deliberation versus spontaneity can
thus not be explained by differences in external conditions. In
contrast, our second main finding of an effect of consequence
involves a change in the situation the agent is in. However,
please note that also in this scenario the participants were
asked to rate the freedom / responsibility of the action,
not the situation.
Another question is how exactly participants understood
the factor Consequence. Participants have rated an agent
as more responsible for an action with consequences than
without consequences. When there are consequences of
an action, there is more for the agent to be responsible
for, so the agent is responsible for more. However, this is
not to say that he has more responsibility. I can kill and
steal with equal responsibility, even if I am responsible for
more in the killing case. Participants might mistake the
degree of responsibility of an agent with the harms the
action causes. A potential follow-up needs to distinguish
degrees of responsibility from degrees of harms for
which a person is responsible in order to clarify what the
participants had in mind.
Another interesting implication of our findings relates to
Libet-style experiments (Libet et al., 1983) Some researchers
interpret the results of Libet’s experiments as evidence that
human freedom is illusory and therefore the concept of
responsibility also needs to be revised (Wegner, 2002). Besides
criticism by empirical researchers (Schurger et al., 2012; Schultze-
Kraft et al., 2016), especially Philosophers have pointed out a
number of serious objections against the Libet-style experiments
and their radical interpretation (Sinnott-Armstrong and Nadel,
2011). Among those objections, one particular critique seems
to be affected by our results. Some philosophers have suggested
that the actions in Libet-style experiments do not qualify as
free, because they lack reasons, distinguishable options, and
real life consequences. “Arbitrary action (i.e., Libet Action) is
at best a degenerate case of freedom of will, one in which
what matters fails to hold” (Roskies, 2011, p. 18). Our results
suggest that this particular objection might fail for the folk
concept of freedom but still succeed for the folk concept of
responsibility. From a folk perspective, actions in Libet-style
experiments qualify as free action even if they are spontaneous,
without much of a choice, and without consequences. The
dissociation between freedom and responsibility in our study
thus means that the Libet-style experiments do not speak to the
issue of responsibility.
In general, the differential effects of deliberation on freedom
and responsibility ratings raise questions as to whether freedom
is considered a necessary condition for responsibility by lay
people. We do not consider our folk psychological finding to
mean that philosophers should avoid postulating this necessity,
but our results serve as a warning that this necessity might
not be intuitive, which is an important consideration given
the immense public interest and engagement in the free will
debate (e.g., Overbye, 2007). Please note, that many philosophers
have argued that their positions should be in line with lay
beliefs (Jackson, 2000).
Our study might help to restructure debates about freedom
and responsibility and partially alleviate the tension between
neuroscience and psychology, which sometimes claim to refer
to lay definitions of these terms (Libet et al., 1983; Libet,
1985, 2005), and philosophy, which often employs more
elaborate definitions of freedom and responsibility (Roskies,
2011). Lay intuitions of freedom are not in line with some
common philosophical theories, because lay people ascribe more
freedom in conditions of spontaneity and in the absence of
reasons (Deutschländer et al., 2017). However, the lay intuitions
regarding responsibility are very well aligned with claims by
many philosophers that responsibility requires consideration of
reasons. These compatibilist philosophers do not normally think
that actual deliberation is crucial for responsibility but only
that the agent has to be able at least in principle to respond
to reasons, an ability typically coined reason-responsiveness
(Fischer and Ravizza, 1998).
This account of responsibility opens up the possibility that
agents sometimes have responsibility without freedom and
that determinism is compatible with responsibility but not
with freedom. Some philosophers (Fischer, 2006) and scientists
(Gazzaniga, 2012) have explicitly endorsed this position, which
is called semi-compatibilism. Our findings follow a pattern that
would be expected if laypeople were to hold semi-compatibilist
beliefs, according to which the ability to adequately consider
reasons in deliberation increases responsibility but is not
necessary for and might even reduce the sense of freedom. An
interesting question is whether our results also extend to actions
that are explicitly irresponsible (as opposed to less responsible).
Our results don’t speak to this clearly enough because overall
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our responsibility ratings were high. However, this is certainly an
interesting question for future research.
Our experiments obviously cannot prove directly that lay
people are semi-compatibilists, as we did not ask them explicitly
about their views on the relationship between determinism
and freedom or moral responsibility. We doubt that lay
people have stable, developed, or detailed views about such
abstract theoretical notions1. Nonetheless, our studies do
show that notions like reason and deliberation, which form
an integral part of the necessary abilities for responsible
agency according to semi-compatibilists, are in fact also
positively associated with responsibility in the mind of lay
people, in contrast with lay intuitions on freedom. The gap
between the intuitions of lay people, scientific results and
philosophical theorizing in this respect might be less deep
than often assumed.
1 The debate over lay intuitions on determinism and compatibilism between
Nahmias (Nahmias et al., 2005, 2007) and Nichols and Knobe (2007) seems very
much to support this point.
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